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7. Are there Structural Barriers 
to Whole-of-Government? 
Professor Ian Marsh 
Is it possible to design effective whole-of-government arrangements within present meta-
structural constraints? The latter has become the primary framework within which 
indigenous policy development and service delivery has been orchestrated. From the 
outset, the profound challenge that this would pose to governance was recognised. Two 
MAC reports (2004, 2007) described the changes in organisation and processes that were 
essential if whole-of-government was to work.  
This included five basic imperatives: 
 substantial initial cross-agency/stakeholder agreement about the broad purposes to 
be pursued;  
 use of the outcomes budget framework to pool resources and to create appropriate 
accountability frameworks;  
 lead-agency staff empowered with sufficient authority to manage whole-of-
government settings and to lead the engagement of local stakeholders,  
 empowering these same managers to engage with relevant individuals and 
interests;  
 And finally ensure the individuals engaged in these latter roles have the 
appropriate networking, collaboration and entrepreneurial skills. 
These are very demanding requirements. Can the development of localised authority and 
localised discretions be reconciled with central determination of outcomes and central 
budgeting and accountability arrangements? Or are devolved, whole-of-government 
outcomes not possible without much more radically decentralised designs?  
What programs are involved? To grasp the whole-of-government challenge, a first step 
involves assessment of the multitude and variety of programs that ICCs are supposed to 
broker into local communities. In practice, they can do this by one of two means: either by 
brokering linkages between communities and programs; or, more demanding, by joining 
individual programs into a funding block funding. By either means, ICCs are expected to 
achieve greater program impacts in a specific local context.  
The Strategic Evaluation of Indigenous Programs (Department of Finance, 2010) offers 
the most recent comprehensive overview. It identified no less than 232 individual 
programs which in one way or another support Indigenous Australians. This report 
reviews these programs in the context of the various broad outcomes that the government 
has established.   
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An earlier ANAO report (2007) focused on the four primary departments - DES, DEWR, 
FaHCSIA, and Health. This report identifies 94 programmes, either mainstream or niche, 
that are relevant to Indigenous affairs. DES operates 15 Indigenous specific programs and 
43 mainstream programs that have Indigenous applications; DEWR 11 indigenous specific 
programs and the Job Network;  FaHCSIA, 6 Indigenous specific  and 6 mainstream 
programs; Health and Aging, 5 Indigenous specific programs and 9 mainstream programs.  
To add to the complexity, many of these major programs have sub components.   
In a report on the indigenous trials, Gray (2006) noted the challenge of program 
management as perceived on-the-ground, in this particular case from Wadeye. The trial 
was intended to reduce the number of individual programs that local communities need to 
manage. In fact in the course of the trial the number of programs applied to the 
community increased to 90. In another example, Dillon and Westbury list the five 
Commonwealth programs that could be tapped to fund natural resource management on 
indigenous land: ‘An important and growing policy area where in recent years scores of 
Indigenous ranger programs have emerged across northern Australia focused on land and 
resource management. Program funding in this area comes from a diverse array of 
agencies: the National Heritage Trust, the Indigenous Protected Areas Program, CDEP, 
STEP and the ABA. …Programs vary in size from hundreds of millions (for example the 
CDEP or ARHP) to less than half a million (for example the Indigenous Children’s 
Program). (p 66) 
With 39% of the indigenous population under 15, education is another critical area. The 
same authors note the array of programs relevant here: ‘The national flagship programs 
include the Youth Allowance and Abstudy: the former is targeted at young people 
studying, undertaking training for Australian apprenticeship, looking for work, or sick; 
the latter at indigenous students. Over and above this FaHCSIA has four ‘niche’ programs 
which provide youth services of various kinds with a total national budget of $34.6 
million and a client base of approximately 340 000 nationally. DEST has at least ten 
youth related Indigenous specific niche programs….the data on numbers of service 
providers suggests that the availability of these programs in remote Australia is very 
patchy…It is clear that across the national government there are a couple of hundred 
different programs potentially allocable to the circumstances of remote citizens. Access is 
a different matter entirely’ ( p. 67/68) 
Finally, they note the bewildering array of programmes aimed at indigenous housing: ‘The 
existence of concurrent state and national responsibilities means that in some areas 
programs are duplicated by each jurisdiction. Housing is a classic example where states, 
territories and national governments deliver both mainstream and Indigenous housing 
and housing related programs, and even within the national government there are a 
number of separate Indigenous housing programs (CHIP/NAHS, CHIP/AACAP, FHBH) 
all delivering housing and essential services at the community level, along with ARHP 
which funds the states and territories to deliver housing at the community level’ (p. 65). 
The whole-of-government architecture was designed to ensure these programs are 
accessed by the citizens that they are intended to serve. How effective have these 
arrangements proven to be? 
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Whole-of-government administrative architecture: Since whole-of-government 
arrangements were introduced in 2002, there have been at least nine reviews. The first 
four covered the initial COAG trials and the rest subsequent developments. Seven were 
official or commissioned evaluations and the remainder independent academic 
assessments: Urbis, Keys, Young, 2006; Morgan Disney, 2006; Gray and Sanders, 2006; 
Gray, 2006; ANAO, 2007; KPMG 2007; Hunt, 2007; FaHCSIA, 2007; O’Flynn and 
Blackman, 2010). All these reviews repeat points stressed in the MAC documents, namely 
that whole-of-government will not work without devolution of authority, funding, 
accountability and coordinated organisation. They also all find continuing and unresolved 
administrative difficulties. It has not proved possible to reconcile centralised ‘siloed’ 
organisation and funding with devolved authority and flexible resource management.  
As an introduction to these unresolved problems, consider the case of Mutitjulu, 
ironically the first community named in the NTER. Before whole-of-government was 
conceived, this community tried, over more than a decade, to obtain for itself a new style 
of governance (Smith, 2009). Its efforts foundered on immovable central structures. This 
story starts in 1991 when the NPY Women’s Council prepared a report highlighting 
concerns about ‘controlling and caring for children’. A series of submissions and 
discussions followed. In 2000 the community council at Mutitjulu asked Centrelink, 
ATSIC and FaCS to work with it to develop a practical strategy to deal with welfare 
dependency and related family problems. Following a consultation, the Community 
Council itself proposed a Participation and Partnership Agreement. The departments did 
not respond. Why? ‘First, the key departments would not support an “All in” community 
model of welfare reform and would not support linking Youth Allowance with school 
attendance, even though these had been specifically requested by community 
members…Second, Centrelink and FACS would not countenance an indigenous 
community working with them to develop and implement locally-relevant breaching rules. 
Neither would they countenance a community organisation being provided with a 
delegation under the Social Security Act in order to do so…Third, entrenched inter-
departmental turf wars in Canberra meant that the departments concerned were unable to 
negotiate a common position…And finally the Australian government was unable or 
unwilling to reform the chaotic state of its departmental program funding in order to 
streamline the pooled funding and grant reporting arrangements that would have been 
required…In late June 2007, the Australian government announced that Mutitjulu would 
be the first community into which it activates national emergency measures. It will do so 
unilaterally’. So far as coordination is concerned, we will see little has changed. 
The findings of the various evaluations affirm that whole-of-government is confounded at 
the critical regional and ICC levels. The obstacles are structural not contingent. Consider 
the two most recent reports, one official (2008, conducted by KPMG) and the other 
independent (2010, conducted by academics from the ANU and the University of 
Canberra). The KPMG study involved a review of internal documents plus interviews with 
158 Australian and state government agency staff and 35 community organisations. The 
following selected observations define the magnitude of the structural barriers that 
continue to frustrate this arrangement despite six years experience and at least eight 
preceding reviews: 
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‘There is a definite trend of line agency staff presenting to communities/organisations as 
representative of their agency…..Communities/organisations reported this as confusing as 
they do not know who to talk to or if they have to talk to all the different agencies instead 
of accessing services through the ICC….ICC staff and line agency staff rarely visit 
communities together’ 
‘Many line agency staff were unable to provide governance and financial management 
assistance to organisations due to probity issues relating to assessment of funding 
applications…Communities advised that it was difficult for them to keep abreast of the 
changing policy and service delivery environment’ 
‘ICC managers reported frustration in undertaking (their intended leadership) role. As 
coordinators, Managers indicated that they do not have authority to gather agency staff 
support….Line agencies confirmed that their staff are directly responsible to their line 
agency and that the ICC manager has no authority to compel or direct staff to undertake 
ICC work. 
‘Line agency staff located in ICCs commented that they experienced a tension between 
their program management responsibilities (i.e. the expectations of their line agency) and 
their responsibility to engage in what they referred to as ICC work….Conversely ICC 
managers reported feeling powerless in some situations as they do not have the authority 
to direct change.’ (p. 9) 
‘The implementation of whole-of-government collaboration in ICCs is an area requiring 
significant improvements. Many of the issues that impede whole-of-government are 
structure and have little to do with ICC staff and management’s willingness to collaborate’ 
(p. 10) 
‘Overwhelmingly the consultation repeated the message that the current funding and 
reporting arrangements are a significant barrier to whole-of-government 
collaboration…Line agencies have different program guidelines, funding rounds and 
delegation which do not align…Complaints were raised about the different risk 
assessments each line agency applies..in some cases this can result in applications 
undergoing up to 8 different risk assessments’ 
‘One ICC took over 12 months to negotiate and approve an SRA which was worth under 
$50 000 in funding…To overcome the barrier of obtaining multiple line agency 
approvals…many ICCs have adopted the approach of developing smaller SRAs in terms of 
dollar value, number of signatures and issues to be addressed’ 
‘A perceived barrier to reducing red tape is line agencies different program and funding 
guidelines….For example one agency may apply more rigorous risk assessment for 
applications over $100 000, while another agency’s more rigorous assessment only 
applies to applications over $150 000.’ 
The findings of the University-based study (O’Flynn and Blackman, 2010) echo these 
conclusions albeit in more graphic terms. This study was based on 48 field interviews 
covering staff at ICCs, State and regional offices and in Canberra. It suggests that despite 
the top-down whole-of-government effort, Mutitjulu’s experience has not been 
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transcended. Their conclusion is unequivocal: ‘Due to entrenched barriers, which 
permeate the broader public service, ICCs have been a failed experiment.’  
Like KPMG, O’Flynn and Blackman identify structural failings in the basic organisational 
design:  
 No or limited assignment of authority to the Indigenous Coordination Centre 
Managers,  
 An ad hoc approach to the representation of departments (which meant staff were 
withdrawn as cost pressures emerged);  
 An underinvestment in skills;  
 Inconsistent operating systems.  
They cite the comments of ICC managers, first on their delegations of authority: 
I could not go out and direct another person to do something in this ICC … because 
they’re not from my agency.  I could (only) ask, influence, beg (Executive Level, ICC). 
Whole of government doesn’t work … when you’ve got all different agencies sitting in 
the one place, supposedly working together … they’re supposed to be all collaborating 
and telling each other what they’re doing … I’m telling you it doesn’t work and I work 
in an ICC and I’ve been there since the day it started (Executive Level, ICC).  
The fact that we’re co-located with [Department A] and [Department B] and a couple 
of [Department C’s] people is just window dressing.  So there’s no whole of 
government activity between them ... There’s no practical program [or] whole of 
government approach (APS Level, ICC). 
The NTER Review also picked up these criticisms but this time from the perspective of the 
clients: ‘There as extensive comment in communities about the lack of co-ordination 
across locally based professional staff. Between the GBMs, Community Employment 
Brokers and shire service managers, there is not a clear point of authority or coordination’  
A second set of unresolved governance issues arose from conflicting vertical and 
horizontal tensions which cut across in the administration of programs: According to 
O’Flynn and Blackman: ‘The pervasiveness of a program focus and the silos that it creates 
were seen as impossible to combat even in a setting where there was physical co-location 
and strong endorsement from Ministers and Secretaries.’ The comments of ICC staff 
provide graphic confirmation: 
There’s all these horrendous issues [in] the way we structure and design ... we’re all 
in-house, independent silos that are not meant to really do anything more than 
service that particular program (Executive Level, ICC).   
It seems to me the whole of government approach is about being entrepreneurial 
inside the public service … [For] program managers and project managers it’s not 
quite like that … [they] are constrained within the approaches and silos (Senior 
Executive Service, ICC). 
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When you go from the top down to the bottom [WG] disconnects at multiple levels.  It 
disconnects through the allocation of finances, it disconnects through the rewards for 
your accountabilities for your program … so all those things work against it (Senior 
Executive Service, National Office). 
A third problematic element involved centralised decision-making. This aspiration also 
fell foul of more embedded administrative practices and requirements:  
The idea [was] for ICCs to have a pool of money that they could make decisions about.  
Well, in the great thing about being risk averse that was all centralised back in 
Canberra: … useless basically.  It just went against the whole thing about whole of 
government which is about sharing, devolving, not controlling everything, but taking 
responsibility and it’s the same pattern.  And that was a bit of its undoing, in fact 
because it was to give people the power to do the deal on the ground (Senior 
Executive Service, ICC).  
There’s systematic and the structural problems that everyone faces … around the 
funding agreements ... really inhibiting for anyone …  and that certainly has happened 
[on] numerous occasions where … people have been able to say, “well I think we can 
do that” and … then going away and finding the actual delegate says, “no” … and yet 
you’ve said, “yes” … the people that are actually there [in ICCs] don’t have ... the 
ability to be able to make a call that can be carried through ... (Executive Level, 
National Office).  
[In the past] you’d have a cup of tea and even if you said “no” [community members] 
appreciated it. Whereas now, God, they’re too scared to pick up the phone.  They just 
feel the concept of the decisions and the power over their life is just so far removed … 
a lot of the funding has been removed back to [the capital] … [and] not only the 
position but the decision making [power] (Executive Level, ICC). 
You cannot make a decision … You can agree and say “we’ll take it up the line” but 
that doesn’t mean squat to me ... a lot of the poor old officers who go out there every 
two weeks, collect notes, build relationships, but in reality it’s a very long and 
tortuous process … (Executive Level, National Office). 
Most recently, under the 2009 National Partnership Agreements between the 
Commonwealth and the States, the same broad arrangements have been extended to 
coordinate the delivery of programs across jurisdictions. Six agreements have already 
been signed and others are foreshowed in relation to native title claims arrangements, 
remote infrastructure and healthy food. In general, the parties also commit to ‘developing 
a co-ordinated approach’ and ‘enabling initiatives to be delivered in a manner appropriate 
to needs in particular locations’. To oversee the arrangements, a Coordinator-General 
based in Canberra was appointed in 2009. This officer would ‘have the authority to work 
across agencies to cut through bureaucratic blockages and red tape…the Coordinator –
General will have direct relationship with Commonwealth Secretaries …and will work 
collaboratively with State and Territory officials and Ministers to achieve a unified 
approach’. This approach replicates on a national scale, the Commonwealth governments 
own whole-of-government arrangements. The ANAO report discussed earlier identified 
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some 95 relevant programs in four departments that were potentially relevant to ICC 
operations. Many sub-divided into a variety of further streams. How many more might be 
added when the diverse array of state programs are included? In the light of the 
experience with ICCs, it is hard to be sanguine about the likely success of this exercise in 
federal-state collaboration.  
Accountabilities as a structural barrier to local effectiveness: Central accountability 
requirements create another barrier to on-the-ground effectiveness. Take health services. 
In the interests of enhancing local choice and control, the Aboriginal Community 
Controlled Health Services (ACCHS) were established in the 1980s. Funding was later 
transferred to ATSIC and grants were on a yearly basis but with an expectation of 
continuance. The Commonwealth Department of Health assumed responsibility in 1995 
and thereafter funding increased. The pattern of funding has since further evolved with 
most services now drawing support from several sources: a core operating grant from the 
Office for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health (OATSIH); state government 
Health Department grants; and finally by proposal driven niche funding that could 
include broader social purposes.  
Each funding source adopts its own application process, accountability framework and 
priorities. In an assessment of these arrangements, Lavoie et al (2009) note: ‘Analyses 
conducted by the Victorian Department of Health suggests that the reporting and 
compliance burden is disproportionate compared to that imposed on other small and 
medium-size funded agencies’ (p. 6). For example, aboriginal agencies receiving on 
average $2 million were accountable for between 26-30 activities. NGOs typically received 
total funding of $10 million for the same array of activities. This study also found that 
agencies can be required to produce up to 59 separate reports for 13 programmes. This 
boosts transaction costs disproportionately.  Further, in a small service disentangling the 
daily time allocation of a single staff member between varieties of programmes can be 
wholly artificial. Finally, a 12 month funding cycle makes the recruitment of staff 
precarious.  
These multiple accountabilities and the associated burden of transaction costs have 
persisted despite having figured so strongly in other evaluations. This suggests that the 
requirements derive from wider structural imperatives and cannot be excised without 
systemic change. 
Consultation and the development of social capital. Every official report since 2001 has 
emphasised the imperative of working with and through local communities (e.g.  
Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2001; ATSIC, 2003; Whole-of-Government 2004; 
Morgan Disney 2006; wicked problems, 2007, NTER Review 2009; Devolved Government 
2009; Department of Finance, 2010; Productivity Commission, 2011). To illustrate the 
complexities that can arise, Edmunds (2010, p. 16) cites the negotiations over James Price 
Point, which involved Woodside and a proposed LNG development. Negotiations were 
conducted with the Kimberley Land Council, the organisation which had statutory 
responsibilities for consultation under the Native Title Act. The Council had secured a 
consensus amongst key traditional owners. But a dissident group challenged these 
processes. Edmunds comments: ‘This is a common situation and one that traditional law 
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could once have dealt with. However, it fits uneasily into contemporary decision making, 
raising a crucial question about how much, and whose consent is needed for informed 
consent.  
If this is one dimension of the issue, another is the quixotic (from the perspective of local 
communities) behaviour of their governmental interlocutors. Take the NTER. This banned 
sales of alcohol on Aboriginal land. According to Maggie Brady, a specialist in alcohol use 
in Indigenous communities: ‘The (political grandstanding associated with the NTER) was 
a little strange considering that most Aboriginal land in the Territory was already dry. 
There were already 107 general restricted areas, all on Aboriginal land and all in non–
urban areas except for one town camp in Alice Springs…..the alcohol recommendations in 
the Little Children are Sacred report…are designed to work with and enhance the NTs 
existing legislative structure and that the Intervention measures unhelpfully cut across 
them’ (2007, cited Edmunds, p. 19).   
Another example involved the impact of the NTER at Wadeye, an early trial site. ‘When a 
crisis erupted at the Wadeye trial site……the Commonwealth government resorted to a 
more coercive approach characteristic of hierarchical or contract government…It has 
chosen not to develop housing through the legitimately elected Thamururr Regional 
Council, with whom it signed the COAG trial agreement thereby by-passing and 
potentially undermining the very indigenous governance structure it partnered with only 
four years ago, and to which it remains formally committed in the NT bilateral agreement 
(Gibbons evidence to Senate Estimates Committee Hearing, 2007, cited in Hunt 2007, p. 
167).  
Smith (2007) describes the proposed governance arrangements for the West Arnhem 
Shire that were developed slowly and after protracted negotiations that had begun in 
2004. Their purpose was to plan implementation of a new local government shire 
covering the entire region. Following protracted on-the-ground negotiations over three 
years which progressively built support amongst relevant groups and communities, a new 
governance structure had been settled. In 2007, the Intervention unceremoniously 
aborted these arrangements, leaving behind a frustrated and cynical local community.   
According to the ANAO, in 2007 75% of 257 managers surveyed in the ANAO Audit 
responded positively to the statement ‘The Indigenous Affairs Arrangements (IAAs) have 
encouraged consultation with indigenous communities at the local and regional levels’. 
How effective were these conversations from the perspective of their interlocutors. The 
on-the-ground evidence is not positive. For example, in May 2010, DEEWR and FaHCSIA 
issued a draft indigenous economic strategy. Submissions were invited and consultations 
held with indigenous communities throughout Australia. The following are the reporter’s 
notes on the consultations held in various remote centres in November 2010: 
In Alice Springs: ‘Approximately 22 (Indigenous) participants attended the 
workshop…People participated in both the questions and answer session and the table 
discussions but there was widespread criticism of the relevance of the Indigenous 
Economic Development Strategy to remote areas and the likelihood of anything changing 
on the ground…..There are no economic foundations in remote communities and this 
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needs to be acknowledged..There was widespread criticism that the strategy was 
homogenising and represented an urban western model…(it) needs to respond to the 
different circumstances, opportunities, economies and drivers in remote regional 
areas..There are so many economic strategies around that people are blasé about “just 
another plan”..The gap between the strategy and what is happening on the ground is very 
wide..There is a different sort of economy operating in remote areas. It’s not just a matter 
of transferring these into real jobs, they are real jobs but not recognised as such.’ 
In Broome: ‘ Indigenous people need to be heard..this has not happened in the past and 
this is being repeated in the current process: not enough time….and doubt as to whether 
the draft strategy will properly take account of the feedback..The current ranger program 
should be expanded. It has been successful in raising confidence and helping people 
become work ready.’ 
In Cairns: ‘Many participants said that over the decades they had participated in similar 
discussions with Government and had raised the same issues….There was obvious 
frustration with the focus of this consultation…the Mayor of Yarrabah led a symbolic 
walkout at 2pm underlying the level of frustration at the meeting…The strategy was seen 
as meaningless without a means of implementing it through planning at the community 
level and there was scepticism that anything would change on the ground..There is a need 
to open up communication between government departments.’ 
In Port Lincoln: ‘There was a high level of scepticism regarding the draft Strategy as 
participants note that consecutive governments had consulted on similar policies in the 
past without any noticeable achievements to date…Government (should) be held 
accountable for not following through its own recommendations in the area of indigenous 
economic development in the past ..The one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate – 
there is a need for regional level planning including local employers and business. Local 
communities both indigenous and non-indigenous need to work together to achieve 
solution’ 
`In Karratha: ‘Real engagement means listening to indigenous people and not just telling 
them…it is difficult to engage with government…..previous feedback for policy 
development over the years has been ignored. There is no apparent correlation between 
what the Australian government proposes and what indigenous people want. A place-
based approach is needed. Different communities have different needs and opportunities’ 
The funding framework: At a material level, W H Stanner’s indictment of the ‘great 
Australian silence’ about Indigenous Australians is reflected in an accumulation of 
deficits which dog present programs: ‘The list would include in no particular order, the 
pre-existing failure of educational outcomes, which lead to a largely non-literate 
indigenous citizenry, extreme housing shortages for personnel required to deliver 
government funded programmes and service across remote Australia; poor law 
enforcement and less than optimal levels of intellectual capital within government 
agencies relevant to remote service delivery……The combined absence of social and 
physical infrastructure means that there is nothing for governments to graft mainstream 
services onto as happens elsewhere. Government appear to discount or underestimate the 
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importance of a pre-existing network of social, physical governance and business 
infrastructure…(Dillon and Westbury. p. 59). 
One important source of equality in services for Australians is the periodic 
determinations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC). Via complex metrics, 
the CGC attempts to equalise funding for service provision around Australia. But there are 
several problems. First, determinations are based on average or mainstream needs. There 
are no special provisions or allowances for remedying acute backlogs such as those that 
exist in remote Australia. These were comprehensively documented by the CGC in its 2001 
report (cited previously).  
Second, while the Commission grants money on the basis of an assessment of needs in 
particular areas like housing, transport etc, there is no requirement for governments to 
spend their allocations in these areas. On the contrary. The States and Territories are free 
to spend the sums as they choose. On the contrary, the Commonwealth has ‘defended the 
practice of making untied general purpose grants to (the states and local government) in 
recognition of their status as independent-elected democratic spheres of government. The 
fact that allocation of these grants was determined through an exercise which made 
reference to Aborigines in the measurement of disability factors in order to achieve some 
degree of fiscal equalisation….was clearly regarded as of secondary importance to the 
principle of general purpose funding’ (Sanders, quoted Rowse, 2002). In addition, the 
Commonwealth operates a substantial number of special or supplementary programs. The 
States and Territories may use the existence of special Commonwealth programs as a 
ground for reducing their own allocations to Indigenous services.  
There is now no aggregate assessment of the needs of remote Australia and no mechanism 
to check that total allocated funds match the rhetoric and proclaimed intentions of 
governments. 
Take the Northern Territory CGC allocation. According to a NT Council of Social Services 
analysis, in 2009 twenty-five per cent of the total $4 billion budget came in special 
purpose payments from Canberra, mostly for indigenous services. A further 55% 
represented a GST allocation by the CGC. The report demonstrates that in 2006-07 the 
Darwin government underspent its CGC allocation by $542 million across a range of key 
social welfare indicators. This represented no less than 42% of the total CGC allocation 
(NTCOSS, October 2008; see also The Australian, 24 October 2009).  The NTCOSS report 
commented: ‘The spending priorities of the NT government exacerbate the differences in 
measures and senses of equality for low-income and disadvantaged people thereby 
contributing to the reduced life expectancy, poor health, violence and other differences 
that they are intended to address’.   
Another issue concerns allocations to local government. These are determined on a per 
capita basis. ‘The bizarre result is that jurisdictions like the Northern Territory with one 
sixth of the Australian land mass receive less in local government assistance than is 
notionally allocated to the population of Geelong’ (Dillon and Westbury, p. 188). 
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A dedicated and periodic CGC review of remote Australia needs and circumstances would 
seem to be a prime requirement. The data collected for the Expenditure assessments 
(noted earlier) could provide a basis for such analyses. 
Whole-of-government policy development - a case study of CDEP: Whole-of-government 
is difficult to achieve not just in on-the-ground delivery, but also in processes of cross-
departmental policy development. Despite its popularity and considerable impact in 
remote Australia, at the same time as it is promulgating ambitious employment targets, 
the government is also curtailing CDEP. At its peak, CDEP engaged some 40 000 people. 
‘From 2005, CDEP has been systematically dismantled…..without much evidence, CDEP is 
being blamed for cost shifting by governments and for poor mainstream employment 
outcomes….as CDEP is dismantled people will be given the choice of mainstream work or 
welfare, on the proviso that work might require migration from home communities…This 
policy change fails to recognise Indigenous aspirations, cultures and life projects’ 
(Altman, 2009; also Sanders).  
Seized by budgetary concerns and a larger paradigm concerning the need to enhance 
pressures on unemployed people to seek work, the specific situation of citizens in remote 
Australia has seemingly received short shrift. What is to be done in remote communities 
where there is zero conventional economic infrastructure? For example, to illustrate the 
effectiveness of CDEP, Altman describes the experience of the Kuninjku community in 
west Arnhem Land: ‘For the majority of Aboriginal people in remote community’s 
migration away from ancestral lands. and from extended kin networks will be neither an 
aspiration nor a solution. This in turn suggests that key institutions like CDEP that are 
currently being dismantled will need to be retained’ (2009, p. 9). He notes the specific 
contributions of CDEP to the Kuninjku economy: harvesting game for local consumption; 
producing art for sale in the national and global arts markets; being employed in paid 
provision of environmental services.  
A review of CDEP by the Department of Finance in 2009 (Finance, 2009) found that the 
scheme had very limited success in fulfilling its work readiness charter and that it was 
almost impossible to assess its community development contribution. It also noted these 
goals are likely to conflict. By contrast, Jon Altman (2011) observes: ‘The Australian 
government (is committed) to radically reform the CDEP because it is erroneously and 
negatively perceived to hamper engagement with the mainstream labour market rather 
than positively as an enabler of remote livelihood possibilities in the hybrid economy. It is 
after all the highly variable interactions between customary, state and market sectors of 
hybrid economies from place to place that give them distinction and potential 
comparative advantage’. These perspectives played no role in the formal assessments. 
The changes to the CDEP scheme in the NT also indicate the difficulties government faces 
in managing policy development on a whole-of-government basis. The acute problems 
recently experienced in town camps may be in part a consequence of reductions in CDEP 
employment. This displaced population from outstations and other settlements. This was 
the intended result. The scheme was run down without town camp capacities being 
augmented. Moreover, there was no development of new town-based employment 
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opportunities and no or little opportunity for mainstream employment, despite the 
promise in the COAG charter to narrow substantially the job gap. 
Finally, the governance requirements for CDEP have been criticised for a want of cultural 
appropriateness: ‘A number of developments in the CDEP program may be viewed as 
quite deliberately coercive and, occasionally, quite unrealistic by the Aboriginal 
organisations involved. They may fundamentally change an Aboriginal organisation’s 
relationship to its community members. These include requirements that no more than 
50% of the Board should be CDEP participants, supervisors or managers. In some remote 
areas almost all of the able-bodied adult population is on CDEP, making this requirement 
impossible to meet without changing the very nature of the organisation. Programs also 
have to meet DEWR-determined targets for placement of CDEP participants in non-CDEP 
jobs…which in some contexts is almost impossible’ (Hunt, 2007, p. 159). 
The Indigenous Economic Development Strategy 2011-2018, released in November 2011 
seems to sideline the potential of hybrid economic activities as a likely source of 
employment in remote locations. It declares that the source of primary opportunity in 
remote locations lies in the existing labour market and in ‘removing barriers to genuine 
commercial ventures’ (p. 16). Later it gestures to green economy opportunities:  ’As 
investment in clean energy sources such as solar, gas and wind increases, the growth of 
the clean energy sector will  also provide many new opportunities. Through the 
Indigenous Carbon Farming Fund ..the Australian government will support Indigenous 
Australians to take up opportunities in carbon abatement activities. This may include 
savanna fire management, feral camel management and environmental 
planting…..Indigenous Protected Areas, while delivering significant environmental 
benefits, will also support economic endeavours such as ecotourism’ (p. 17).   
Conclusion: The Indigenous Clearing House in FaHCSIA maintains a register which 
records current, pending and past evaluation studies. There are currently 572 entries. 
Taking recent and pending years, 128 refer to studies due in 2010, 63 to studies due in 
2012 and 121 studies have no precise date attached to them. These seem an extraordinary 
number. The sector is being heavily researched. The ANAO has three pending program 
studies, all due in 2011. However, not one study involves the effectiveness of the 
government’s own governance. Indeed, as noted earlier, the major comprehensive 
overview of this policy area concluded that ‘on balance’ present uses were due more to the 
complexity of the area than to failures of governance (Department of Finance, 2010). The 
evidence reviewed here suggests this finding is at odds with the facts. 
  
